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Two New Lessons from the
Asian Miracles
HING-MAN LEUNG
School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University
ABSTRACT Four Asian economies – Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan – have grown
at spectacular speeds adopting different strategies. Past debates focused on their growth takeoff.
The present paper studies their future outlook. As an economy matures, sustaining economic
performance requires innovation and technology upgrading. Hong Kong, under a minimal-
ist administration, is now critically deficient in technology. Singapore, dependent on foreign
multinationals, is struggling to become a creator and not just a user of technology. We seek to
explain why Hong Kong and Singapore are so much less innovative than Korea and Taiwan.
KEY WORDS: Asian miracle, free market, public policy, indigenous industries, R&D
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: O14, O38, O57.
Introduction
After all that has been said and debated about the ‘Asian miracles’, which refer to
some East Asian growth performances since the 1960s, there are two new lessons
yet to learn about them. The main point of this paper is that sustaining growth for a
country that has made a takeoff requires building up an indigenous R&D capability.
The state needs to intervene, because R&D is fraught with externalities. These lessons
are emerging as Singapore, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea)
and Chinese Taiwan (Taiwan) gradually mature.
The past debate focused on how they grew, especially how they took off so spectac-
ularly. There can be no questions, no matter how some berate the Asian high savings
and low productivity, that all four economies left the poor third world and joined the
rich first world in an amazingly short time. To deny the huge jumps in their standard
of living is not possible.
But how to make a miracle? These countries have showed us more ways than
one. The 1993 World Bank Report, entitled The East Asian Miracle, insisted that
the neoclassical free market model was superior to the interventionist government
to promote economic growth. This view now appears frivolous; for after all, each
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of the four economies put up stunning growth performances. For other third-world
nations eager to learn from the Asian four, there must be more pertinent lessons than
distinguishing the winners from the runner-ups, given that all four broke world records
as far as growth takeoff is concerned.1
Perkins (1994) suggested that there are three models of Asian development – Hong
Kong and Singapore’s free market model, Korea and Taiwan’s Japanese model, and a
third consisting of resource-rich countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
However, we find it more illuminating to put just the four economies into three growth
categories. Doing so suggests three policy options, and we shall discuss the pitfalls
and promises of each policy choice. Hong Kong has long adopted an extreme version
of laissez faire, refusing to interfere with the free market system wherever feasible.
Singapore is distinguished by her heavy reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI).
Korea and Taiwan did it differently from Singapore and Hong Kong. Like Japan, Korea
and Taiwan put their faith in the indigenous business conglomerates, and deliberately
avoided courting the multinational corporations (MNCs) for FDI. This ‘four countries
– three models’ framework demonstrates the following two lessons vividly.
The first lesson relates to Hong Kong, which is probably the freest economy in the
world.2 The question is not whether the free market helped Hong Kong grow: it did.
Just for the record, in constant 1995 prices using the World Development Indicator, in
1960 Hong Kong’s GDP per capita was merely 32 percent of the United Kingdom’s
and 23 percent of the United States’. In 1987, Hong Kong began to surpass the UK.
In 2003 Hong Kong achieved per capita GDP 12 percent higher than the UK, and
only 19 percent below the US.
What few have noticed, however, is that the Hong Kong economy now stands at
a crossroads. The total absence of any public policy to promote its indigenous R&D
capacity has meant that Hong Kong, contrary to Korea and Taiwan, is now seriously
deficient on research and technology. Some may think that only the developed coun-
tries need research, the less developed just soak up the spillovers effortlessly. This
is wrong. Cohen & Levinthal (1989) pointed out that absorption also needs R&D
because spillovers are not free. Mansfield et al. (1981) showed that imitation cost
could be as high as 60 percent of the innovation cost. Hong Kong, in any case, has
long passed the imitative stage of her development. Given the already hollowed tech-
nological base, it is hard to see how she can maintain strong economic growth into
the future.3
Accordingly, our first hypothesis is that a minimalist state cannot sustain long
term growth, though it has a proven record in growth takeoff. It is important to
distinguish a laissez faire government from a minimalist state. While laissez faire
relies on the free market to allocate resources, it intervenes where the market fails,
providing public goods when the market refuses to do so. Knowledge is a public
good. Western governments, many of whom are ardent believers of the laissez faire
doctrine, aggressively subsidize research and development activities. The minimalist
government in Hong Kong has always been aloof and hesitant in supporting R&D.
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We will argue that this failure to upgrade technology is putting Hong Kong’s long
term future in jeopardy.
Our second lesson is Singapore, which we contrast sharply with Korea and Taiwan.
Perkins reminded us that Korea and Taiwan were influenced by their Japanese colonial
history. Singapore, Korea and Taiwan grew under considerable government interven-
tions, and all three put up tremendous growth performances. The difference, however,
is that the paths they traveled have led each to distinct structural conditions, leading
to divergent future growth prospects.
One of the most striking characteristics of Singapore is her reliance on FDI. From
1970 to 2000, as the percentage of gross capital formation, Singapore’s annual FDI
inflow was 59.5 times Korea’s, 10.7 times Taiwan’s, 853.8 times Japan’s, 7.3 times
the high income OECD country-average, and 6 times the middle income country-
average.4 The MNCs launched Singapore’s takeoff, but they also inadvertently pre-
vented the formation of a vibrant, local manufacturing and technology base. As Sin-
gapore matures, she increasingly finds her indigenous creativity and innovativeness
wanting. Hewlett Packard, Siemens, Maxtor, Sony and many other MNCs have been
in Singapore for decades, but they have not shared their technologies completely
selflessly with Singapore. Creativity takes time to nourish and to cultivate. Having
built her economy on the back of FDI, Singapore is finding it hard to shake off her
dependence on the big multinationals, and start competing with them.
All aspiring countries have a real choice to make on how much to rely on FDI to
develop their economies. We shall argue that over-reliance on FDI is detrimental to
indigenous businesses, and it harms the local R&D capability. This lesson is made
more pertinent by the World Bank’s and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development’s (UNCTAD) enthusiastic embrace of FDI as a conduit to growth.
Growth strategies, such as the reliance on FDI and the MNCs, develop momentums
that are increasingly difficult to turn back.
We substantiate these claims in a case study involving the four economies.5 Case
studies are inductive, allowing specific insights rather than generalizations. We ac-
knowledge that our two lessons may not apply equally to all developing nations. Each
country has different needs and complexities. It is precisely these specificities, how-
ever, that led Lipsey & Sjo¨holm (2005, pp. 40–41) to conclude that ‘the search for
universal relationships [between growth and FDI] is futile, [. . . and that] case studies
can be most valuable’.
The four Asian economies, we should emphasize, are not case studies like any
others. They have been widely studied in the past two decades, becoming a focal
point of the growth debate. With the emerging China and India, they are offering
hope and inspirations to the less developed world. The Young (1992, 1995) and
Krugman (1994) total factor productivity debate helped put the spotlight on Hong
Kong and Singapore. Against this backdrop of familiarity and global attention, the four
economies have become almost the prototypes of how backward countries can catch
up. Correct understanding of their experience is therefore of particular importance.
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Our plan is as follows. The next section examines Hong Kong, while the third
section compares Singapore with Korea and Taiwan. The fourth section concludes
and evaluates the two lessons.
Hong Kong: Minimalism versus Economic Maturity
Hong Kong often receives more accolades than the other ‘miracle’ economies. Milton
Friedman (1980, p. 34) fondly called Hong Kong the ‘modern exemplar of free mar-
kets and limited government’. Young (1992, 1995) and Krugman (1996) praised Hong
Kong’s free market system just as enthusiastically as they chided Singapore’s pater-
nalistic state (see Note 1 below). In that vein, the World Bank’s East Asian Miracle
(World Bank, 1993, p. 31, our emphasis) concluded that ‘promotion of specific in-
dustries generally did not work’, and ‘getting the fundamentals right was essential’
(World Bank, 1993, p. 32). The first ‘fundamental’ was competitive markets, for
which Hong Kong is well known. They were critical of Singapore, Korea and Taiwan
for deliberately targeting growth industries such as electronics, plastic, shipbuilding
and steel.
The World Bank view was erroneous on two counts. First, Hong Kong’s minimalist
state went much further than the traditional laissez faire, and we must realize that it
failed to correct basic market failures such as in R&D. Second, as far as growth takeoff
is concerned, not only did the promotion of specific industries generally work, but
Hong Kong’s long term growth rate has lagged behind the other three. In the 1960s,
Hong Kong’s per capita GDP was four times Taiwan’s and three times Korea’s; by
the end of the 1990s the ratio had decreased to only 1.7 times of both Taiwan’s and
Korea’s. Recently, Singapore has caught up with Hong Kong’s GDP per capita. All
four economies took off successfully. Less developed countries should not be misled
into believing that laissez faire worked and deliberate policy did not, or the other way
round.
To see what truly hurts growth we should look instead at an example of failure. A
neighboring and in many ways comparable economy that has failed is the Philippines.
The Philippines failed because of rampant corruption at multiple levels of government
and businesses. She did not fail because of the lack of free markets, and judging by
Hong Kong’s success, neither did the Philippines fail because of the absence of
a deliberate growth policy. A recent advertisement put up on the streets of Hong
Kong by the Independent Commission against Corruption6 asks, ‘What would Hong
Kong have become if not for the ICAC?’ The short answer I would suggest is ‘the
Philippines’. Singapore, and to a lesser extent Taiwan and Korea, have relatively clean
and efficient governments. The curbing of corruption is, as the World Bank Report
correctly pointed out, a first precondition for growth takeoff.
Beyond basic preconditions, growth strategies begin to make a difference. To
demonstrate how a minimalist state hampers sustained growth, we next exhibit three
pieces of evidence from Hong Kong – her neglect for research and development
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Table 1. R&D intensity and GDP per capita of 23 countries, 1996–2000
(1) Research and
development expenditure (2) Year 2000
as % of GDP, averaged GDP per capita (3) Ranking of (4) Ranking of
over 1996–2000 at 1995 US$ column (1) column (2)
Australia 1.6 23543 15 13
Brazil 0.8 4626 21 20
Canada 1.8 22981 13 14
China 0.8 825 22 23
Denmark 2.0 38482 10 3
Finland 2.9 31983 3 5
France 2.2 30094 9 9
Germany 2.4 32678 8 4
Hong Kong 0.4 25230 24 12
India 1.2 463 18 24
Ireland 1.3 28106 17 11
Israel 3.2 17067 2 17
Italy 1.0 20868 19 16
Japan 2.9 44775 4 2
Korea, Rep. 2.6 13199 6 18
Netherlands 2.0 31217 11 8
Poland 0.7 3678 23 21
Russian Fed. 1.0 2471 20 22
Singapore 1.6 28295 16 10
Sweden 3.7 31338 1 7
Switzerland 2.7 46777 5 1
Taiwan 2.0 12876 12 19
United Kingdom 1.8 22237 14 15
United States 2.6 31843 7 6
Source: World Development Indicator, the World Bank, and Taiwan National Statistics at
http://www.stat.gov.tw/main.htm
(R&D), her ultra-competitive industrial structure, and her service-only economy. Each
of these poses a threat to her future performance.
R&D and Small Firm Size
Backward countries learn by imitating new technology, which requires some, al-
though not a great deal of R&D. As an economy matures it must build up its research
capabilities. Table 1 shows 23 countries’ R&D expenditures as percentages of GDP.
Columns 3 and 4 of the table show the rankings of R&D intensity, as well as the
rankings of per capita GDP at 2000. In general, a richer country conducts R&D more
intensively, and the correlation between the GDP ranking and the R&D ranking is a
strong 0.65.
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Hong Kong has glaringly neglected research. Her R&D intensity is the lowest
of the 23 countries, even though she is the 12th richest among them. Hong Kong’s
R&D intensity of 0.4 percent GDP is 1/4 of Singapore’s, even though Singapore’s
is only 2/3 of the United States’. In addition (not shown in Table 1), Hong Kong’s
R&D intensity is only 2/3 that of an average ‘middle income country’ as defined by
the World Bank, although Hong Kong’s per capita income is 13 times higher. Hong
Kong’s R&D intensity is only 17 percent that of an OECD country, even though her
per capita income is 84 percent of the OECD’s.
Hong Kong is an open, trade-intensive economy. Averaging over the 1990s, Hong
Kong’s high-tech exports such as aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific
instruments and electrical machinery is only 3.4 percent of her GDP. By comparison,
Singapore’s high-tech export is 18 times higher at 63.2 percent of GDP. Hong Kong’s
neglect for research is worsening.
Compared with the other countries, the primary contributing factor of Hong Kong’s
neglect for R&D is her minimalist economic policy. R&D has spillover externalities.
Even a laissez faire government protects intellectual property rights, a duty which the
Hong Kong government has failed to discharge, or discharged only half-heartedly.
Intellectual piracy has remained rampant in Hong Kong to this day. For instance,
pirated movie video disks are frequently put on sale even before the films begin
showing on the big screen.
Advanced countries devote resources to R&D either through government subsidies,
or through large corporations having sufficient scales to cover the R&D fixed cost. The
only consistent policy that the Hong Kong administration has maintained, ironically,
is not to have any R&D policies.
One of the reasons why private businesses in Hong Kong do not care about innova-
tion is that they are too small. Small company size is both a cause and a consequence
of the high intensity of business competition in Hong Kong. With intense competition,
manufacturing firms in Hong Kong had to stay small and be nimble to cope with rapid
changes in market conditions. As an ‘exemplary free market’ system, Hong Kong re-
sembles the textbook example of perfect competition, with infinitely many atomistic
companies sharing a similar technology, producing almost identical commodities.
The average Hong Kong manufacturing concern employed only 15 workers in 1990,
and even that shrank to merely 11 workers per firm in 2000.7
Such an ultra-competitive business environment cannot afford any meaningful
R&D. The strength of Hong Kong’s free market is that it relentlessly invigorates
the enterprising spirit, and everyone is forever ready to pound on short term profit
opportunities. Hong Kong’s 1960s were the days of plastic flowers and toys, when
thousands of small companies started using labor intensive, commonly accessible
technology. When plastics reached the end of its product life cycle, competition led
Hong Kong not to pursue technology upgrading, but to equally low-tech, labor in-
tensive lines such as garment, and simple electronics such as transistor radios. Hong
Kong companies were too small to bother about R&D, and the pace of competitive
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business was too fast for the entrepreneurs to invest in projects that do not make im-
mediate profits. R&D and technology upgrading are long term undertakings, which
is alien to Hong Kong’s ultra-competitive environment. The free market system and
the intense competition worked together to perpetuate the market failure in R&D,
stagnating Hong Kong’s technology for many decades.
Some may object to our assertion that Hong Kong is super-competitive, since
the business community is dominated by a few mega tycoons such as Li Ka Shing,
Henry Fok and Gordon Wu. This point is valid, though it only strengthens our ar-
gument. The non-interventionist policy gives the monopoly power unhindered free
play in Hong Kong. Talk to any small businessmen in Hong Kong, and they will
tell you how their government habitually favors the tycoons, and how uneven are the
economic playing field. The tycoons, of course, cleverly courted the fancy of Her
Majesty’s colonial government, as well as their new masters in Beijing. Unfortu-
nately, pure monopolies are never energetic sponsors of research activities. It is well
documented in the Industrial Organization literature, that innovative activities are the
lowest when the market structure is either very competitive, or very concentrated.
Most of Hong Kong’s tycoons built their fortunes on property development and on
speculation, needing little technology, making them nonchalant about technology
upgrading.
Another factor contributing to the neglect of technology is the virtual annihilation
of the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong. To that we now turn.
An All-service Economy
As technology stagnates and the firm size shrinks, Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector
begins to disappear. It shrank from 23.7 percent of GDP in 1980 to a mere 6.2
percent in 1998 – a 6.9 percent annual reduction for two decades. The decrease was
gathering pace, recording 11.8 percent annual reduction in the 1990s, compared to
only 2.1 percent during the 1980s. Nowhere did manufacturing shrink as fast, and
as completely as in Hong Kong. By comparison, Singapore’s manufacturing sector
expanded its share of GDP from 23.1 percent in the 1980s to 24.7 percent in the
1990s.
The services sector, the allure of finance and banking notwithstanding, cannot match
manufacturing’s technological progress in the long run. The literature on the relative
listlessness of the services sector dates back to Baumol’s (1967) ‘cost disease’. Baumol
et al. (1985) provided estimates of productivity progress rates for the United States
from 1947–1976. They found that US manufacturing had between 2.5 to 3.2 percent
productivity growth per year, finance and insurance had only 0.5 percent, and general
services only 0.93 percent. Computer and information technology improved banking
and other service productivity at the point of computerization, but service remains
labor intensive, and productivity cannot progress at the same rate as manufacturing.
Imai (2001) estimated the sectoral productivity growth for Hong Kong, and found
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manufacturing productivity grew at 2 percent per year from 1981–1997, and banking
and other service productivity grew at only 0.7 percent per year.
Thus, the shift of economic activities from manufacturing to banking had an
income-level effect, yielding a one-time benefit by raising the profit margin. Hong
Kong enjoyed that benefit during the 1980s and the 1990s. Thereafter, per capita
GDP growth relies increasingly on the unprogressive service sector, which is set to
retard Hong Kong’s future growth. The misgivings of free competition and a non-
interventionist policy were hard to see when growth took off, but it is increasingly
apparent during economic maturity. Hong Kong has always been proud of her free
wheeling, enterprising way of life. This has served her well during the takeoff stage.
The British colonial government established a stable political structure and an effi-
cient administrative bureaucracy. Hong Kong’s population was educated up to the
secondary school level – enough to supply the low-tech, labor intensive manufactur-
ing industries such as textile, garment, plastic, toys, watches and jewelry. They were
very competitive and agile, and the free enterprising spirit propelled growth takeoff
without difficulties. Then the market fails, especially in innovation and in property
rights, and that becomes critical when the economy gradually matures.
Another factor that contributes to Hong Kong’s predicament is her peripheral re-
lations with the political masters at the centre. Hong Kong has always played a
peripheral role, first to the British colonial power for more than a century, then to
China after 1997. It is easy to understand why an external political master is apathetic
towards the periphery’s interests. For instance, despite the great growth takeoff, Hong
Kong had only two small universities until the late 1980s. The British government
had no problems seeing Hong Kong’s youngsters going to universities in Britain,
where they paid the high foreign student fees. They saw no long term needs to build
up the tertiary education in Hong Kong. The Chinese Handover in 1997 renewed this
centre-peripheral relationship. By then the neglect of research and development was
entrenched. The new masters in Beijing were more concerned with maintaining the
status quo, minimizing change, than with promoting inventions and new technology.
The industrialization in China presented Hong Kong with new opportunities. Iron-
ically, that only helped erode Hong Kong’s technological base more rapidly. After
Hong Kong’s rapid growth takeoff, wages rose, which would normally drive com-
panies to adopt two strategies. One is to upgrade by committing to R&D, for which
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan required and received substantial helps from the state.
The other is to stay low-tech, shifting production to lower-wage countries. Japan
and the other OECD countries practice both strategies – keeping R&D and high-tech
production at home, and shifting low-tech production abroad. Singapore, Taiwan and
Korea rely more on technology upgrading than on outward FDI.
Hong Kong is the exception. She exported her labor-intensive production abroad,
but never moved up the technology ladder at home. When China opened her doors
to FDI in 1978, Hong Kong manufacturers stampeded to flee the escalating cost at
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home by entering China. The government stood idly by, happily watching the free
market complete its course of action. The rapid outward FDI provided an escape route
during the 1980s, only to perpetuate Hong Kong’s neglect of research and technology.
By 2000, manufacturing had virtually hollowed out, making it pointless to engage
in R&D, as there was little manufacturing left to upgrade. Initially, the majority of
the low-tech and labor intensive manufacturing in the Pearl River Delta was owned
and run by Hong Kong companies. Two decades later, the mainlanders have mastered
the operations themselves, diluting Hong Kong’s comparative advantage. When the
Chinese manufacturing begins to move up the technology ladder, few of their success
stories owe significant contributions from Hong Kong. Many Hong Kong expatriates
in China are now getting retrenched, or having to accept large pay cuts to keep their
employment.
As Hong Kong moves towards banking and finance, it seems in some ways to
resemble small vibrant economies such as Switzerland, and one may wonder why
we worry for Hong Kong but not for the Swiss. This analogy however is misleading.
Despite Switzerland’s emphasis on banking and finance, she spent during the 1990s
an annual 2.7 percent of her GDP on R&D, compared to Hong Kong’s 0.4 percent.
Switzerland had 4698 researchers and technicians in R&D per million people, com-
pared with Hong Kong’s 1145.8 The Swiss manufacturing sector is in a much better
shape than that of Hong Kong.9
Others may also object to our interpretation, citing New York as a counter example.
Both Hong Kong and New York have a great manufacturing hinterland, which allows
New York to prosper by specializing in financial and management services. It is true
that, in the short run, Hong Kong would have suffered a great deal more if not for
the Chinese phenomenal growth. We must remember, however, for several decades
after 1997, Hong Kong will remain an economic entity separate from China. Unlike
New York, Hong Kong has her own monetary, financial and tax systems, and there is
no free movement of capital and labor between Hong Kong and the hinterland. Even
mainland tourists visiting Hong Kong need visas from the Chinese authority, who
relaxed such restrictions recently, only out of pity for the hardship in Hong Kong.
The key factor is comparative advantage, and Shanghai as a business center is
rapidly gaining over Hong Kong. One such advantage is, surprisingly, the language.
Cantonese – Hong Kong’s dialect – was popular in China at the beginning of the
Chinese reform, but it quickly lost its glitter when Shanghai and other Chinese cities
began to eclipse Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s level of Mandarin – the mainland dialect
– is far inferior to that in China. The level of English is rapidly improving in Shanghai
and in Beijing, and deteriorating nearly as swiftly in Hong Kong. The counter example
of New York is imperfect at best. Hong Kong had the opportunity to spearhead China’s
manufacturing revolution by introducing, managing and upgrading manufacturing
technology, which New York does to its hinterland. This opportunity was lost because
of the longstanding commitment to non-intervention by her minimalist government.
10 H.-M. Leung
Singapore: How Good is FDI?
Now we leave Hong Kong, and turn to two other models of economic growth. One
comprises Korea and Taiwan, who nurtured their indigenous businesses. The other is
Singapore, which relied on FDI and the MNCs. Korea and Taiwan shared a great deal in
common because of their Japanese colonial past. Korea’s chaebol and Taiwan’s guanxi
qiye (related enterprises or big business clans) inherited many characteristics of the
Japanese zaibatsu (renamed keiretsu after the Second World War). Their governments
supported these business conglomerates, and the state protection continues long after
the conglomerates have grown into international giants.
Korea and Taiwan are inward-looking compared with Singapore, in the sense that
the chaebol and guanxi qiye propelled economic growth on the back of an indigenous
business community. By contrast, Singapore relied on FDI and the MNCs, with the
local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at best playing a subsidiary role in
economic development. At times, the SMEs appeared downright burdensome because
of their technological backwardness, paling in comparison with the power and the
dominance of the multinational heavyweights.
Apart from the FDI and the MNCs, Singapore also has many Government-linked
Companies (GLCs). But they chose to involve in investment holdings (Temasek
Holdings), telecommunications and other services (SingTel), which enjoy a high
degree of local monopoly. The Korean and the Taiwanese governments, by contrast,
were keen to promote manufacturing such as semiconductors, shipbuilding, automo-
bile, and steel. The chaebol and the guanxi qiye were urged to compete internationally.
Growth is learning. Everyone must learn, though they do it under different condi-
tions. Workers learn through training and experience, companies learn via production
and R&D, managers and entrepreneurs learn by managing and competing internation-
ally. Over the decades, Singapore and Singaporeans have lived in a close symbiotic
relation with FDI and the MNCs. Generations have learned how to serve and to de-
pend on the multinationals, rather than to compete with them. Many in Singapore
believe that they cannot do without the MNCs, although the MNCs can survive with-
out Singapore. In what follows, we discuss this symbiotic relation and its impact on
the society, on R&D, and on sustained growth.
FDI
There has been a worldwide upsurge of FDI since the 1970s. Using UNCTAD’s FDI
database, world FDI inflows increased by an impressive annual 24.3 percent from
1970 to 2000. The developed countries’ FDI inflow has increased by 28 percent
per year, and the developing countries increased by 20.2 percent per year. Among
the public and the political commentaries, successfully attracting FDI is frequently
construed as a prerequisite for economic development.
Singapore has been an undisputed front-runner in hosting FDI. The Singapore gov-
ernment set up the Economic Development Board (EDB) in 1961, armed with 100
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million Singapore dollars, and a mission of ‘convincing foreign investors that Singa-
pore was a good place for business’.10 Throughout the 1990s, Singapore consistently
ranked among the world’s top five best FDI destinations according to the UNCTAD
‘Inward FDI Potential Index’.
The contrast with Korea and Taiwan is striking. From 1970–2003, the average
annual FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP was 46 percent for Singapore, but only
2 percent for Korea and 4 percent for Taiwan. For the same period, the average FDI
inward stock as a percentage of GDP was 99 for Singapore, but only 5 for Korea and
8 for Taiwan.11
The consequences of Singapore’s pro-FDI and Korea/Taiwan’s pro-indigenous
policies are fundamental and far-reaching. Not only have generations grown up serv-
ing the MNCs, but the conscious decision to lure FDI with various concessions has
crowded out local enterprises, and stifled the local entrepreneurial spirit. In Singa-
pore, success is more often measured by the position one holds in a big multina-
tional company, than by the glory of building up a successful enterprise, and there
are very few of them anyway. Many university graduates prefer working for the
MNCs to the local SMEs. Some Singaporean entrepreneurs find it easier to operate
outside Singapore, away from the strong arms of the foreign corporations and the
government.
To be fair, Singapore courted the MNCs in the 1960s precisely because the local
entrepreneurs could not provide enough employment opportunities. The Shanghai
business community fleeing communism in 1949 landed in Hong Kong, not Singapore.
A negative spiral then developed: the dominance of FDI makes local businesses harder
to succeed, which in turn deepens the foreign dependence. A development policy once
engaged tends to develop its own momentum, becoming increasingly difficult to turn
back.
The last point also applies to the sharply contrasting policies of Korea and Taiwan,
who chose to support and promote local conglomerates, and to keep out FDI and the
MNCs. Like the Japanese zaibatsu or keiretsu, the Korean chaebol and the Taiwanese
guanxi qiye soon became so prominent in their economies that their governments
cannot but continue supporting them. The lesson for aspiring developing countries is
that although there are many ways to growth takeoff, the initial policy determines the
nation’s fate for many years to come. Economists call this state-dependent or multiple
equilibria. The contrast of destiny is revealed nowhere more clearly than in the area
of R&D.
R&D
We argued earlier that R&D is increasingly important as an economy matures.
Singapore used to spend substantially less on R&D than Korea and Taiwan. Ac-
cording to the World Development Indicator, in 1996 Singapore spent 1.4 percent of
GDP on research, well below Korea’s 2.6 percent and Taiwan’s 1.8 percent. However,
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in 2001 Singapore was spending 2.1 percent, compared with Korea’s 3 percent and
Taiwan’s 2.2 percent. Singapore seems to be fast catching up in recent years.
These percentages, however, exaggerate Singapore’s research effort since they do
not distinguish between local and foreign R&D. Industrial technology is proprietary,
and research conducted by foreign MNCs is not the same as research done by in-
digenous companies. This term ‘indigenous’ remains relevant even in the face of
globalization and the internationalization of businesses. True enough, Toyota now
employs a large number of people in its overseas subsidiaries, and over 50 percent of
Samsung’s shareholders are foreign investors. What remains critical, however, is that
Toyota carries more weight in the Japanese economy than in any other economy, and
Korea’s fortune is tied more closely to that of Samsung than any other economy. When
Samsung makes profits, Korea benefits more than any other individual country. When
Samsung advances its technology, even if some of the discoveries are made in its
research subsidiary in Singapore, Korea stands to benefit much more than Singapore
especially during the long run.
The difference was clearly demonstrated in the following example. In 2003, Western
Digital, Maxtor and Seagate pulled their disk drive manufacturing operations from
Singapore, moving them to Malaysia, Thailand and China. They took with them all
their technology, which resulted in thousands of job losses, and ended Singapore’s
position as a worldwide disk drive manufacturing centre, which she held for two
decades. The disk drive manufacturing process used frontline technology, but Max-
tor and Seagate mainly hired unskilled workers in Singapore. The years of being a
leading disk drive centre did not create an indigenous Singapore company capable of
competing with the MNCs. Maxtor and Seagate conducted some R&D in Singapore,
but it is hard to see what was left for Singapore once they had gone. The EDB has
been very successful creating jobs, but not so impressive in igniting a technological
and entrepreneurial revolution in Singapore.
We should distinguish between a totally foreign owned subsidiary, and an equity
joint venture. From the host country’s perspective, a 100 percent foreign-owned com-
pany is more willing to bring in the most advanced technology than a joint-venture
company, but less willing to transfer the technology to the host. A 100 percent foreign
research laboratory has complete ownership of its discoveries, and technology spills
over much less than in an equity joint venture. Unlike Korea and Taiwan, Singapore
does not favor joint ventures over the wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries. A large
percentage of high-technology manufacturing firms in Singapore are MNCs, and an
even larger percentage of MNCs are 100 percent foreign-owned. This limits technol-
ogy spillover, and helps explain why Singapore’s manufacturing technology has not
advanced very rapidly. Mahmood & Singh (2003) studied the number of patents filed
by the four Asian economies, and concluded that Taiwan and Korea are ‘far ahead’
of Singapore and Hong Kong in innovation and technology.
The records of R&D spending tell a similar story. In Singapore, MNCs were re-
sponsible for 33 percent of total national R&D spending.12 In sharp contrast, foreign
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companies performed a negligible 0.02 percent of total R&D in Taiwan, and 0.07
percent in Korea.13 If we count only indigenous R&D, Singapore in 2001 spent only
0.7 percent of GDP (0.33 of 2.1 percents) on R&D, a far cry from Korea’s 3 percent
and Taiwan’s 2.2 percent.
A related difficulty facing Singapore is the small size of her indigenous compa-
nies. R&D is a fixed cost, and local companies in Singapore are too small to conduct
research. Korea and Taiwan overcame this scale restriction, because of their govern-
ments’ policies to nurture the chaebol and the guanxi qiye. Korea’s Daewoo, Hyundai,
Samsung and Goldstar, and Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics, China Trust, Linden Interna-
tional and Shin Kong have acquired the scale and depth unmatched by the domestic
enterprises in Singapore.
The Singapore SMEs often operate as supporting industries to the MNCs. That
may seem a convenient arrangement, but it also keeps them as servants and under-
dogs, rather than rising to compete with the MNCs. The multinationals in Singapore
are technologically advanced and financially powerful. Their presence has provided
employment opportunities in Singapore, but they may also have prevented local com-
panies from maturing and succeeding in the competitive global environment.
Conclusions
The four Asian economies have not only raised the well-being of their citizens, but
they have offered hopes for rapidly eradicating economic backwardness, inviting
other countries to emulate their examples. Each economy is unique, and the four
have succeeded in different ways. The two lessons offered in this paper are not uni-
versal generalizations, but universal generalizations are not even desirable given the
uniqueness of countries and conditions. The four Asian economies have been widely
studied in the literature. Their familiarity, coupled with the novelty of our insights,
has made this inductive exercise worth undertaking. Hong Kong demonstrated that
the free market, together with a clean and benevolent government, is a potent agent for
growth takeoff. Singapore, Korea and Taiwan showed that deliberate growth policies
are equally able to propel the initial rapid development.
Our first conclusion is that some government interventions are required to sustain
long run growth, especially in the area of technology upgrading. When the free mar-
ket fails to build up indigenous R&D capability, the government must step in and
intervene. Hong Kong wrongly adhered to a minimalist ideology, failing to recognize
that the free market is a poor conduit to research, development, and technology. When
technology stagnates, long term growth will also stall. Modern theory has shown that
knowledge lies at the heart of growth and prosperity. Knowledge is a public good
that requires government interventions. The minimalist system can deliver the initial
growth takeoff, but it is far less capable to sustain long term growth.
The experience of Singapore exposes a separate issue: that we cannot rely on
FDI to sustain long term growth. Less-developed countries need more than just the
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capital and the machinery from the foreign investors. More importantly, they need the
foreigner’s knowledge and their advanced technology. An appropriate institutional
setting is required to transfer knowledge efficiently. There is, again, a distinction
between growth takeoff and longer term economic maturity. Singapore has relied too
heavily on foreign MNCs. Judging by the examples of Korea and Taiwan, Singapore
should have discriminated against the wholly foreign-owned MNC, in favor of joint
ventures which are more conducive to technology spillovers. The wholly foreign
MNCs may bring in the most advanced machines, but they have neither the incentive
nor the obligation to diffuse the technology locally. At worst, they may even crowd
out local businesses, to the detriment of the host country’s sustained development.
An important question left unanswered is what role democratic freedom plays
in development (see Islam & Chowdhury, 2000). This question is relevant because
during takeoff, none of the four Asian economies had any Western-styled, liberal
democracy. Korea and Taiwan were under military rule, Hong Kong was a British
colony, and Singapore was essentially a one-party polity. All four economies took off
successfully. This suggests that a multi-party liberal democracy was not a prerequisite
for growth takeoff.
Again, sustained development may need something drastically different from take-
off. Democratic freedom, including the freedom of speech and to challenge the status
quo, could be a crucial ingredient for sustained growth. Let us briefly consider Sin-
gapore as a case in point. Singaporeans had lived comfortably under a dominating
political leader for more than three decades. As Lee Kuan Yew puts it, ‘what a country
needs . . . is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads to in-
discipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development’ (see Economist,
27 August 1994). However, a well-disciplined people may soon learn that life is more
livable if they do not ask the unconventional questions, not only when it comes to
politics, but also in non-political areas. Innovativeness and entrepreneurship requires
the opposite: an aptitude that is anything but conventional. The successful inventor
and entrepreneur beg to differ from the average crowd. If a culture stifles dissent,
it also inculcates mediocrity. Liberal democracy, free speech, and probably human
rights, together they nurture the ability and the spirit to challenge the existing norm.
The same free spirit drives innovation and enterprise. The demise of this spirit will
hurt the sustained long term growth.
Notes
1. The past debate had two focal points. The first was the 1993 World Bank Report which elicited
widespread criticisms – see Amsden (1994), Kwon (1994), Lall (1994), and Yanagihara (1994). The
second was the total factor productivity (see Young, 1992, 1995; and Krugman, 1994). Stiglitz (2001, p.
512) recently summed it up this way: ‘In a sense, the total factor productivity debate is much ado about
nothing’. Stiglitz reasoned that the methodology of estimating the TFP growth is highly unreliable:
‘it is as if the distance between Newark and New York were to be determined by using a 12-inch
rule to measure the distance between New York and Los Angeles and Newark and Los Angeles, and
subtracting the difference’ (Stiglitz, 2001, pp. 511–512).
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2. Indicators such as the Economic Freedom of the World (see http://www.freetheworld.org/) consistently
rank Hong Kong top.
3. Some may object to this grim projection of Hong Kong, due to the strong backing she receives from
the booming China. This indeed is a good fortune bestowed on Hong Kong, as China is eager to keep
Hong Kong afloat if only to show to Taiwan the virtue of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘One country-two systems’.
Despite Beijing’s favors, Hong Kong has experienced prolonged unemployment and sluggish growth
in recent years. We shall further discuss the China connection later.
4. From the World Development Indicator on-line, UNCTAD, and Taiwan’s government statistics.
5. For brevity, only essential statistics are reported here. More detailed statistical tables and a longer
version of this paper are available upon request from the author.
6. Locally known as the ICAC, set up by the British colonial government in 1974.
7. Survey of Industrial Production, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, various years.
8. World Development Indicator on-line.
9. I am grateful to Professor Ronald Findlay for an interesting discussion concerning Switzerland. My
view, however, does not necessarily concur with his.
10. See http://www.sedb.com/edbcorp/sg/en uk/index/about edb/vision mission history/
1960s.html.
11. UNCTAD FDI Database and Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 2003.
12. National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2002 (Table 3.4), Singapore government’s Agency for Science,
Technology and Research.
13. Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 2003, Table 53, p. 97, and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology,
http://www.most.go.kr/most/english/activies 01 2.jsp.
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